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TAX FORUM
DORIS L. BOSWORTH, CPA, Editor

PAYROLL TAX SAVINGS—SICK PAY
If the employer has a definite plan for
payment of wages during periods when em
ployees are absent from work due to sickness
or accident, these wages are exempt from
social security taxes, including Medicare and
Federal unemployment tax. Unlike the income
tax sick pay exclusion, there is no dollar
ceiling or waiting period, the exclusion apply
ing to all sick pay. The plan must be in writ
ing, or otherwise made known to the employ
ees, and must cover all employees or a specified
group of employees.
All employers who have a large number of
employees earning less than the various pay
roll tax maxima can save payroll taxes through
the exclusion of “sick pay.” The following
example illustrates how this tax saving might
work out in dollars and cents. In 1966, you
have 100 employees earning less than $6,600
annually (all employees who earn more than
$6,600 annually in excess of sick pay would
have no savings). It is company policy to pay
them in full for the time they are out on
account of sickness or accident. These 100
employees are out sick on an average of
three days a year and have average earnings of
$100.00 a week. 100 employees times three

sick days equals 300 sick days divided by 5
equals 60 weeks times 100 equals $6,000 sick
pay. By taking advantage of the sick pay
exclusion, you save $252 in social security
and Medicare alone. This may not sound like
much, but if your company is a corporation
in the 48% tax bracket and its profit margin
is 10% on sales before taxes, you would have
to make sales totaling $4,846 to get $252
profit after income taxes. As you can see, the
savings can be substantial when sick pay
of all employees earning less than the $6,600
maximum, for F.I.C.A. and Medicare is con
sidered.
Do not forget you would save on Federal
and State unemployment taxes too on the
employees who earn less than the payroll tax
maximum.
When there is no definite plan, the only
wages excluded from taxable wages will be
those paid on account of sickness or accident
after the expiration of six calendar months
following the last month in which the em
ployee worked for the paying employer.
Reference: Internal Revenue Code Sections
3121 (a) and 3306 (b)
Betty Jane Roberts
Tucson Chapter, ASWA

“FRIBOURG” REVISITED

vate ruling from the Treasury Department to
the effect that the remaining life of the vessel
was three years, and proceeded to depreciate
over this life. In 1957 due to the Suez Canal
blockage the price of ships soared briefly and
taxpayer sold the ship at a profit of $504,000.
In the same year depreciation in the amount
of $135,000 was claimed. This latter amount
was disallowed as an expense by the Treasury
Department under the Cohn rule. The Supreme
Court found in favor of the taxpayer, indi
cating that the gain and depreciation were un
related. It held that depreciation was calculated
on the useful life of the ship and that the sale
at such a tremendous profit was not due to
any error in estimating the life, but rather to
a spectacular change in the world market
for this type of ship.

Many taxpayers have been faced with the
necessity of accepting adjustments to depre
ciation when returns for years governed by the
Cohn rule (Revenue Ruling 62-92) were ex
amined. The adjustment consisted of a dis
allowance of depreciation in the year of
sale in the case of any asset sold at a gain.
This rule apparently has been upset with the
recent Supreme Court decision in Fribourg
Navigation Co. Inc. v. Com., S. Ct., 3/7/66.
Undoubtedly, protective claims have been
filed pending the outcome of this decision, or
if the statute is still open, the filing of such
claims is presently contemplated. A word of
caution on this score is in order, however.
The Fribourg Navigation case dealt with the
purchase of a Liberty ship in 1955. Subsequent
to its purchase, the taxpayer obtained a pri9

“FRIBOURG” REVISITED

(Continued)

Before filing claims for refund, the rationale
of this decision must be carefully considered.
In the decision the key phrase that practition
ers should not overlook is “. . . the Commis
sioner may require redetermination of useful
life or salvage value when it becomes apparent
that either of these factors has been mis
calculated.” Under these circumstances it is
obvious that in the case of a re-examination
based on the Fribourg case taxpayer must
be able to prove unequivocally that the gain
arose solely from appreciation in value of
the property, and not through incorrect esti
mates of the life and salvage value.
An example of the type of situation that
would meet the standards of the Fribourg case
has occurred frequently in the past few years.
Taxpayers who have been in business for

thirty or forty years in a particular area and
who have maintained an efficient repair and
maintenance program may, for one reason or
another, find it desirable to dispose of their
plant. The selling price will in all probability
reflect a tremendous appreciation in real es
tate values, rather than incorrect depreciation
in the past. If such is the case, the Fribourg,
and not the Cohn rule would prevail.
In view of the recapture rules under Sec
tion 1245 the Fribourg decision will be limited
in its application with respect to machinery and
equipment. In the case of the sale of buildings,
however, the fairly nominal adjustment re
quired under Section 1250 still leaves this
type of asset vulnerable, and every effort
should be made to accumulate evidence
sufficient to overcome the Cohn rule.
D.L.B.

WATCH THOSE LOANS!

Two cases have come down recently which,
although in unrelated areas, point out the
necessity of establishing the validity of in
debtedness in certain financial transactions.
Both cases were decided in favor of the
taxpayer but are notable in that they indicate
a trend in Treasury Department thinking that
must not be overlooked.
The first case, Seven Sixty Ranch Co. v.
Kennedy, D. C. Wyo., 3/4/66 involved a
Subchapter S corporation. The corporation
gave its sole stockholder two notes in return
for his taking over corporate loans with the
banks. The amount of the bank loans assumed
in excess of the amount of notes given to the
stockholder were treated as donated surplus.
The Treasury Department regarded these loans
from the stockholders as a second class of
stock and attempted to terminate Subchapter
S status. The District Court decided in favor
of the taxpayer and determined that the loans
were in fact bona fide. In view of two pre
vious decisions in this area that went against
the taxpayer, however, and the necessity of
litigating the present issue in the District
Court, the safest rule would appear to be
avoidance of indebtedness to a stockholder in

a Subchapter S corporation.
The second case involving indebtedness
represents the first time the Treasury Depart
ment has challenged this type of transaction.
It is particularly important because it is the
type of transaction that normally occurs in
many families. In Elizabeth Johnson v. U. S.,
D. C. Texas, 2/28/66 parents gave their
children money in return for non-interest bear
ing demand notes. At the time the case arose
the notes had been almost completely repaid,
but the Treasury Department attempted to
impute taxable gifts annually to the extent
of interest at 3-1/2%. The District Court
indicated that, as yet, parents are not required
to deal with children on a complete arm’s
length basis to the extent that they must
charge interest on any loans made to them.
There was a recognition of a common practice
to loan money to children to give them a start
in life. The point to be borne in mind here
is that the loans had been almost completely
repaid and were therefore bona fide. In all
similar transactions in the future it would
seem taxpayers must be prepared to establish
the validity of the loans if gift tax implications
are to be avoided.
D.L.B.
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